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INTRODUCTION
Ukrainian audit market has been under reform since 1993. Important steps have been taken since then. International standards of audit have been adopted as national and system of quality control have been designed. But The presence of competition in the Ukrainian audit market as a necessary feature for compliance with the EU rules is a subject for discussion. It relates to the only segment of the market -domestic audit companies. Ukrainian audit market demonstrates high concentration in the most profitable segment and free competition in the cheaper segments by the size of services provided on regional level. Thus, the market can be considered as quasi-competitive.
Moreover, to improve the quality of audit in the state companies, Ukrainian government had adopted the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers №390 «On some issues of the financial statements audit of state-owned companies». This resolution has discriminatory influence on the resident audit companies. It introduces artificial restrictive covenants for resident companies in favor of major market players, including 4 biggest audit companies in the world (well known as Big 4) and other international networks.
However, authoritative studies, including the study of Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA, 2011) 12 , confirm that abolition of discriminatory covenants is the basis of the development of competitive audit market.
Despite a wide range of papers devoted to audit market competition analysis, Ukrainian audit market still faces the lack of academic activity especially in the context of the implementation of the EU audit regulation.
The aim of this study is to show the quasicompetitive character of the Ukrainian audit market and to provide policy changes to increase the competitiveness of this market. This is quite important for Ukraine nowadays as it moves in the EU direction. This study tries to fill these gaps and provides a statistical analysis of the Ukrainian audit market concentration for the 2007-2014 in the regional level. Also it expands the market concentration methodology by using multivariate regression analysis with dummy variables and Kruskal-Wallis test to confirm the hypothesis about market heterogeneity along with the standard approaches like Hirschman Index, Lerner Index, Comprehensive concentration index, Entropy Index etc.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on the audit market concentration. Section 3 outlines data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 offers some policy implication concerning competition in Ukrainian audit market. Finally, Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Competition in audit market is object of attention of regulators around the world because of the undeniable importance of audit quality for the companies and financial institutions. The role of audit companies in maintaining transparency and stability of the economies in the post-crisis period are the focus areas for audit regulators.
In European Commission Green Paper, 2010 Competition Commission, UK, 2013 15 , exploring the experience of audit companies listed in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250, said that 31% of FTSE 100 companies and 20% FTSE 250 companies had the same auditor from the Big 4, BDO, Grant Thornton for more than 20 years and 67% of FTSE 100 companies and 52% of FTSE 250 companies for over ten years. In this regard, requirements for auditor rotation to ensure market competition are vital. Though, the discriminatory covenants in favor of the Big 4, including the loan or investment agreements are not insuperable for Mid Tier companies, these criteria should be banned. Oxera, 2006 16 provides evidence that the increase in the audit market concentration can raise 13 European Commission Green Paper (2010) Consultation on audit policyLessons from the Crisis, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/finance/ consultations/2010/green-paper-audit/index_en.htm 14 audit fees for provided services. However, the fact that audit committees are focused primarily on the quality and reputation of audit firms, rather than on price parameters, is also proved. In addition, it is difficult to distinguish between the impact on audit fees of market concentration and other regulatory requirements.
Requests to the Office of Fair Trading about the audit market competition and the dominance of Big 4 were made by the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee UK. The final report (House of Lords, 2010 17 ) did not confirm a direct correlation between lower audit quality and increased concentration of audit firms. At the same time the largest audit companies' activity in high concentrated financial services segment during the last financial crisis was criticized.
Such initiatives also emerged in the US. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and the US senate are working to review the existing models of professional auditing activities regulation.
Implementation of mandatory auditor rotation to ensure proper audit independence in the interests of shareholders is considered as well as the role of auditor in preventing new financial crises.
The issue of audit industry concentration in the US in the context of its sustainability, effectiveness, competition and audit of large public companies are studied by the Treasury, 2006 18 21 ) paid attention to the concentration of firms providing professional services and confirmed the hypothesis that tight oligopolistic market structure allows the existence of price competition. In GAO 2008 it is noted that audit market concentration has significant impact on the remuneration paid to the auditors by the largest public companies.
ACCA, 2011 22 highlights the benefits of the competition expansion and the abolition of barriers for smaller audit firms. However, its representatives warn that artificial intervention in a market environment with the requirements for the restructuring of large audit firms cannot be positive.
CIMA, 2010 23 UK, examines a number of factors that led to significant concentration of audit firms: complexity of audit and accounting standards, requirements for global coverage, significant infrastructure investments and reputational risks of choosing an auditor outside of the Big4. Despite these factors, the audit market is competitive. The importance of audit market competition and interests of key stakeholder groups is widely discussed by above mentioned regulators on the local and global level. However, there is no consensus on the possibility of achieving free competition in these markets and on the impact of existing market concentration on key parameters of audit services.
Existing academic approaches are also different. Scientists' papers dedicated to the study of the audit market concentration can be structured in the following directions: 1) study of the relationship between competition and different variables: audit fees, the quality of audit services, mandatory auditor rotation;
2) further consolidation of audit companies and changes in the competitive environment;
3) different objects -sectoral, regional, national level; 4) study of the methodology of market concentration evaluation.
As to the first direction, it is worth noting that the study of audit market competition in general, conducted in the work Doogar and Easley, (1998) agreed with the conclusion GAO, 2008 25 about the possibility of the existence of competition in oligopolistic market structure.
The study of relationships (both negative and positive) between the level of audit market concentration and key audit market parameters demonstrates considerable variation of results.
Thus, the results of studies of the effect of audit market concentration on the company's earnings quality are provided by Francis et al. (2013) . Accordingly, regulators should focus not only on the extent of Big 4 share, but also on the qualitative structure of the particles. The problem of audit market competition was comprehensively considered at all levels: local, national, global. For example, at the national level problem is studied by Francis et al. (2013) . At the level of industries and local markets (using the Fama-Frenchten-industry classification system) the problem of audit competition is highlighted by Hogan and Jeter (1999) So, the need for an integrated approach to the study of competition on developing audit market and its measurements should be emphasized. The Ukrainian audit market is relatively young as the practice of corporate governance, transparency and reporting.
The lack of domestic experience in the formation of the market and low methodological framework for the auditing standards' implementation led to blind transfer of audit practices from foreign countries, without taking into account national peculiarities and mentality.
Entering the Ukrainian audit market Big 4 companies caused him to quasi-competitive development: with concentrated segment of the world's largest accountancy network, serving the needs of the largest companies in Ukraine and relatively competitive segment of national auditors, cooperating with smaller companies.
Regarding the level of research, we offer to choose the geographical principle of structuring the audit market (by administrative regions). This principle corresponds with the level of audit activity, general level of economic activity and investment attractiveness, and allows differentiating the market segments controlled by domestic and international audit companies.
Concerning the research methodology, it should be noted that it needs further development, because most of the analyzed papers use traditional indicators of market power. These indicators should be supplemented by specific tools for market concentration research.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this study annual data from the Audit Chamber of Ukraine (ACU -http://www.apu.com.ua/ pro-apu) is used. The sample covers the period from 2007 to the 2015 including. To assess the competiveness of the Ukrainian audit market we use the following indicators in the regional breakdown (as the object all of the 26 regions of Ukraine are used, including temporary occupied territories of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions because sample period includes time when they were complete part of Ukraine):
number of reports provided to the ACU; number of orders; actual size of the provided services; average costs per order; number of orders per company; average income per company.
The key hypothesis we test is: Ukrainian audit market is quasi-competitive.
To test this hypothesis we use different methods and technics:
average Average analysis provides preliminary evidence on whether Ukrainian audit market is highly competitive or not.
To provide additional evidences in favor of the tested hypothesis specific statistical tests can be used. To define their class (parametric or nonparametric tests) data set need to be checked for normality.
To this Pearson's and Kolmogorov-Smirnov criterions were applied. The results are presented in Appendix B. Since the critical values exceed calculated values of the Pearson's and KolmogorovSmirnov criterions we may conclude that data are not normally distributed and therefore only nonparametric tests are valid.
The use of Kruskal-Wallis test is explained by the large number of the analyzed groups (26).
The Null Hypothesis (H0) in each case is that the data belong to the same population, a rejection of the null representing the differences in the analyzed groups of data (groups are uneven) and thus market is not freely competitive.
As an additional element to confirm the Kruskal-Wallis test results we propose to use multiple regression analysis with dummy variables.
where, -value on the period t; a 0 -mean value for the whole generation population (Ukraine); a n -mean value for specific data group (certain region); D nt -dummy variable for specific data group, equal to 0 or 1. D nt is 1 when data belong to the specific group (for example data belong to Kiev and specific data group is Kiev). D nt is 0 when data don't belong to the specific group (for example data characterize Sumy region but specific data group is Kiev); ε t -Random error term for period t.
The size, sign and statistical significance of the dummy coefficients provide information about possible differences between groups. In case of dummy coefficient is statistically significant (p<0.05) we conclude that this group belongs to another general population. And this indirectly evidence in favor of unevenness of the Ukrainian audit market.
If preliminary statistical assessments evidence in favor of the key hypothesis (Ukrainian audit market is quasi-competitive) we go to the next stage of the analysis -quantitative assessments of the competitiveness. To do this we use specific indicators. Their short description is provided below.
Concentration Ration (CR)
Concentration ratio is used to measure the level of market control of the largest firms in the market and to illustrate the degree to which market is oligopolistic
The concentration ratio is the percentage of market share held by the largest n firms in an industry.
where, -concentration ratio; -the number of the largest regions; -market share, held by the і-th region;
Depending on the value of the CR the level of market competition can be characterized as follows:
-0% -no concentration. Means perfect competition;
-0%-50% -low concentration. Depending on concrete size of the CR market competition ranges from perfect competition to an oligopoly -50%-80% -medium concentration. Usually is typical for the oligopoly.
-80%-100% -high concentration. Market ranges from an oligopoly to monopoly.
-100% -total concentration. The market is monopoly.
Hirschman Index (ННІ)
Hirschman Index (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or HHI) is used to measure the size of firms in relation to the whole market. First used by Hirschman (1964) . This is an indicator of the competition level in the market.
where, is the market share of region i in the market, and n is the number of the regions in the market.
It ranges in the interval [0;1]: 1) 0 -no concentration; 2) from 0 to 0,1 -low concentration; 3) from 0,10 to 0,18 -medium concentration; 4) above 0,18 -high concentration.
Lerner Index
The Lerner index describes a firm's market power. Formalized by Lerner (1934) . The prices in the market differ from the marginal costs the less competitive market is.
where, P is the market price set by the firm and MC is the firm's marginal cost.
The index ranges from a o to 1. Higher numbers implying greater market power. For a perfectly competitive market (where P=MC), Lerner index =0. In this case any market participant has no market power.
The Rosenbluth Index
The Rosenbluth Index includes not only the firm market share, but also the firm rank. Was developed by Rosenbluth (1955):
where, i indicates the firm's rank position.
The Rosenbluth Index deviates in the range [1/n;1]. The higher number of the Index the more monopolized the market is.
Comprehensive Concentration Index (CCI)
Comprehensive concentration index (Horvarth 1970) reflects both relative dispersion and absolute magnitude of the biggest market participant share.
where, 1 is the share of the largest market participant.
CCI ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the CCI is the less competitive is market.
The Entropy Index
The entropy index was defined by Theil (1972) . The entropy index is a measure of "evenness"-the extent to which groups are evenly distributed among organizational units. It can also be interpreted as the difference between the diversity (entropy) of the system and the weighted average diversity of individual units, expressed as a fraction of the total diversity of the system
Small values of the Entropy Index reflect high concentration.
The Lorenz Curve
The standard Lorenz curve involves a comparison between the cumulative market share and cumulative shares of the number of firms (Lorenz, 1905) .
The curve is a graph showing the proportion of overall income or wealth assumed by the bottom x% of the people, although this is not rigorously true for a finite population (see below). It is often used to represent income distribution, where it shows for the bottom x% of households, what percentage (y%) of the total income they have. The percentage of households is plotted on the x-axis, the percentage of income on the y-axis. It can also be used to show distribution of assets. In such use, many economists consider it to be a measure of social inequality.
The curve is used for the visual (graph) interpretation of the unevenness of the market. The cumulative percentage of companies is plotted on the x-axis, the cumulative percentage of market share on the y-axis.
In theory, absolutely equal distribution of the market is characterized by the bisector coming out of the start point of the coordinate system. The more actual distribution deviates from the theoretical empirical distribution, the greater the degree of inequality present in the market.
The Gini Coefficient
The Gini coefficient measures the inequality among values of a frequency distribution (for example, market shares). The Gini coefficient was proposed by Gini (1909) as a measure of inequality of income or wealth.
̅ -average of the market shares of the market participants The Gini coefficient deviates from 0 (perfect competition in the market) to 1 (monopoly).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Average Analysis
The first stage of our analysis is preliminary estimations of the inequality in Ukrainian audit market. To do this we use simple average analysis. Results are presented in Appendix A.
Results show geographical inequalities in the market. Values of Kyiv and Kyiv region are several times higher than the results of other regions of Ukraine. This includes such indicators as Number of reports provided to the ACU; Number of orders; Actual size of provided services, Average costs per order; Average per company.
The only indicator that more or less evenly distributed regionally is Number of orders per company.
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Results of the Kruskal-Wallis test are presented in Appendix C.
As can be seen data from different region belong to the different general populations. This is indirect evidence in favor of the quasicompetitiveness of the Ukrainian audit market.
Regression Analysis with Dummy Variables
Results of the multiple regression analysis with dummy variables are presented in Appendix D. They confirm hypothesis of the geographical inequality of the Ukrainian audit market. Most of the coefficients at the dummy variables (Number of reports provided to the ACU, Number of orders, Actual size of the provided services) are statistically significant and differ from one another by several times. Plus the overall quality of the models is rather high.
So regressions analysis results confirm the hypothesis about quasi-competitiveness of the Ukrainian audit market.
Indicators of Market Concentration
Results of the analysis of the market concentration indicators (Concentration ratio (CR1), Concentration ratio (CR4), Hirschman Index (HHI), Rosenbluth Index, Comprehensive concentration index (ССІ), Entropy index and Gini coefficient) are presented in Appendix E.
Generalization of these indicators analysis for the year 2014 is provided in table 1.
As can be seen, the level of the competiveness in the Ukrainian audit market with the regional division is rather low. And so the Hypothesis about quasi-competitiveness of the Ukrainian audit market is confirmed. 
Lerner Index
Results of the Lerner Index calculations are presented in Appendix F. As can be seen Lerner Index is very close to 1. This means that marginal costs are very low comparing with the prices of the services and evidences in favor of high monopolization of the Ukrainian audit market.
So the Hypothesis about quasi-competitiveness of the Ukrainian audit market is confirmed.
Lorenz Curve
To provide visual interpretation of the inequality of the Ukrainian audit market the Lorenz curve is used. Results for the selected indicators are presented in Appendix G.
Results evidence in favor of the inequality in the Ukrainian audit market and confirm the hypothesis of the quasi-competitiveness of the market.
Policy Suggestions
Statistical analysis confirms the quasi-competitive nature of the Ukrainian audit market and dominance of the Big 4 audit companies. However, the situation in audit regulation in Ukraine gives additional evidences in favor of these results and requires urgent action.
Despite some attempts to reform regulation of audit field in the context of the implementation Among these documents the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers № 390 «On some issues of the financial statements audit of public sector companies» can be regarded. This Resolution approved the list of criterions to choose auditors by some major companies in public sector (see Table 2 for details).
We believe these criterions are restrictive covenants. They hinder the development of free competition in the audit market in Ukraine. Implementation of these covenants is possible only for the Big 4 companies and companies from the large international networks.
Statutory audit of socially significant companies in the context of Directive 2014/56 / EU should be regulated in the interests and for the surveillance of society. But directive implementation of these criterions for the selection of audit companies by government agencies restricts competitiveness in the audit market. The right to choose the auditor should be prerogative of the company and / or its audit committee on the basis that corresponds to the company's tender practice.
Covenants/criterions mentioned above are contrary not only to the best international practice (ACCA and Competition Commission, UK) but also to the norms of Articles 6 and 31 of the Commercial Code of Ukraine, which prohibits restrictions on the audit and cooperation between public economic entities.
Table 2. Covenants for auditors of significant public companies
Covenants 1 group 2 group
Register of auditing firms and auditors The audit company should be included in the Register Experience in providing audit services to business entities of the industry Provide at least two audits or other audit services to entities of the industry over the last three years The number of employees who are directly involved in providing audit services and work in conditions of full time job, and which concluded the employment contract. not less than 100 not less than 10
The number of employees with a qualification certificate to practice audit activity in Ukraine 5 3
The number of employees, who must have at least one document that certifies the passing of the full program of certification issued by one of the organizations which is a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC): ACCA, AICPA, ICAEW;
-
Annual income of the audit company over the last three years not less than 30 mln. UAH not less than 3 mln. UAH). The insurance contract to third parties (to cover possible losses related with professional activities) during the period of audit services. not less than 50 mln. UAH not less than 10 mln. UAH According to the Law of Ukraine «On Protection of Economic Competition» from 11.01.2001 monopoly (dominant) position is concerned to the entity whose share alone on the market exceeds 35%, the three entities exceeding 50%, and five entities exceeding 70%.
Results of Concentration Index calculations (CR 1, CR 4) show that these quantitative criterions of audit market monopolization for analyzed parameters far exceeded norms, especially for the "actual size of provided services".
Kyiv and Kyiv region are dominating among other regions by the results of the calculations of market power indexes and regression analysis.
The level of market concentration, calculated for indicator «number of reports provided to ACU» is the result of registration in this most economically active region the vast majority of foreign and big domestic audit companies. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the actual size of provided services, as another analyzed indicator, no such tight binding geographic as auditors provides their services in other regions.
Based on the quasi-competitive nature of audit market in Ukraine, destructive conditions that limit competition in it should be eliminated. We developed some recommendations on competition stimulation, addressing to Ukraine Ministry of Finance and ACU in the context of European integration processes:
abolition of discriminatory conditions for auditors performing tasks in the major segments of public companies and companies of the financial services that are contrary to national law, the Commercial Code of Ukraine, the Law «On Protection of Economic Competition» and best international practice;
prohibition of restrictive covenants and preferences for some market participants, especially international companies and Big 4 segment that have reputation and infrastructure advantages; promotion of integrity tendering practices in attracting auditors to perform tasks on the principles of transparency and openness;
strengthening the monitoring, development legislative mechanisms and effectiveness of regulatory activities Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine in audit sphere;
promotion of the development of local audit practice with a focus on raising the quality of audit services, training and education of staff in domestic auditor companies.
CONCLUSIONS
The study of competitiveness in audit market is actualized in the post-crisis period to ensure quality of financial statements audit for the system important companies, along with the preservation of the transparency of audit practices and preventing further consolidation in this segment. The importance of the audit competition issues highlighted by the relevant regulators around the world: European Commission (EU Green Paper, Directive 2014/56 / EU), Competition Commission and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, CIMA UK, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Government Accountability Office, USA and ACCA, OECD.
Results of previous studies are diversified as for the field of research (establishing the relationship between levels of market concentration and the parameters of the audit services) so for the methodology and objects of analysis.
Ukrainian audit market is quite interesting object of analysis because of its developing status and divergent regional structure Using geographic (regional) research approach we compare the level of competition in the audit market with the level of audit activity and general economic activity of regions in Ukraine, to differentiate them on the basis of residency of audit companies.
Simple average analysis of reports number, number of orders, the actual size of services provided, the average costs per order, orders per subject, the average income per audit company was performed to provide preliminary information about the competitiveness on the Ukrainian audit market.
Besides the traditional methods of market concentration evaluation (Concentration Index, the Gini Coefficient, Lorenz curve, the HH index) a number of additional indices (Rosenbluth Index, Lerner Index, Comprehensive concentration index and Entropy Index) were calculated and evidenced in favor of quasi-competitive nature of the Ukrainian audit market.
Kruskal-Wallis test and multi-factor regression analysis with dummy variables confirmed in indirect way the heterogeneity of audit market in Ukraine.
Results of non-parametric methods are consistent with calculations of presented coefficients. So, hypothesis about quasi-competitive nature of audit market in Ukraine was confirmed.
These results suggest that existing framework of audit market regulation and supervision from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine and Audit Chamber of Ukraine need to be changed. We provide some policy implications aimed to change the current situation. Among them are refusal from restrictive covenants used to choose auditors by some major companies in public sector; promotion of integrity tendering practices in attracting auditors to perform tasks on the principles of transparency and openness; increasing the effectiveness of the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine regulatory activities in audit sphere; development of local audit practice. We believe their incorporation will increase competitiveness in the Ukrainian audit market.
APPENDIX A Simple average analysis 100,00%
APPENDIX E
Indicators of market concentration
